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There are major differences in regulation among various countries. A particular case is 
the difference between the EU and US in regulating biotechnology. We develop a 
formal and dynamic model of government decision-making on regulation. We show that 
minor differences in consumer preferences can lead to important and persistent 
regulatory differences, and that temporary shocks to preferences can have long-lasting 
effects. This hysteresis in regulatory differences is shown to be caused by producer 
protectionist motives. We argue that this model may contribute to explain the difference 
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 On Butterflies and Frankenstein:  
A Dynamic Theory of Regulation 
 
Johan F.M. Swinnen and Thijs Vandemoortele 
 
“A small blue butterfly sits on a cherry tree in a remote province of China. As is the 
way of butterflies, while it sits it occasionally opens and closes its wings. It could have 
opened its wings twice just now; but in fact it moved them just once – and the miniscule 
difference in the resulting eddies of air around the butterfly makes the difference 
between whether, two months later, a hurricane sweeps across southern England or 
harmlessly dies out over the Atlantic.” 
Smith (1991, p247) 
 
“If they want to sell us Frankenfood, perhaps it's time to gather the villagers, light some 
torches and head to the castle.” 
Lewis (1992) 
1 Introduction 
In many cases regulation and standards are introduced when preferences change (e.g. 
regarding social issues), environmental conditions change (e.g. climate change) or when 
new technologies become available (e.g. nuclear energy, genetic modification (GM)). 
These changes induce new policy questions to either allow (approve) new technologies 
or not; to try to change behavior in response of environmental and social concerns, or 
not.  
There are major differences in technology regulation among countries, reflected 
in the abundance of differences in labor standards, food safety and quality standards, 
environmental standards, etc. A particular case is the difference in GM technology 
regulation between the EU and the US. Since the end of the 1990s, EU legislation has 
put a de facto moratorium on the approval of GM products whereas the US has chosen 
to rely on pre-existing laws considering GM products as substantially equivalent to 
conventional ones (Sheldon 2002). This difference has traditionally been attributed to 
either differences in consumer preferences, or to trade protectionist motives. Neither of   - 3 - 
these arguments provides a satisfactory explanation – at least not in isolation – and lacks 
a dynamic perspective.  
The ‘different consumer preferences’ argument advances that European 
consumers are more risk averse and concerned with food safety, and therefore distrust 
biotechnology more, whereas US consumers are indifferent toward GM products (Curtis 
et al. 2004). However, according to Paarlberg (2008), consumers on both sides of the 
Atlantic tend to dislike GM technology. Additionally, this difference in EU and US 
consumer preferences is not evident from a historical perspective either. There has been 
an important shift in the difference between consumer and environmental protection 
policies in the EU and US, as illustrated by Vogel (2003): “[f]rom the 1960s through 
the mid 1980s American regulatory standards tended to be more stringent, 
comprehensive and innovative than in either individual European countries or in the 
EU. However, since around 1990 the obverse has been true; many important EU 
consumer and environmental regulations are now more precautionary than their 
American counterparts.” Moreover, surveys on consumer attitudes with respect to 
biotechnology that illustrate these differences in consumer preferences are endogenous 
to GM regulation. In countries where GM products are available consumer preferences 
may shift in favor of this technology, while inversely consumers may distrust GM 
technology more in countries where GM products have been banned.  
A related argument is that European consumers have only limited confidence in 
national public bodies. Trust in regulatory authorities is significantly higher in the US 
than in Europe, which is said to explain why citizens’ demands for GM regulation are 
stronger in Europe (Gaskell et al. 1999; Nelson 2001). However, this would – somewhat 
paradoxically – imply that European consumers demand more regulation from 
authorities in which they have lower trust.   - 4 - 
A second argument focuses on the interests of the agrochemical and seed 
industry, and farmers. Biotechnology regulation is said to support agrochemical 
companies, either by creating higher returns on investment in biotechnology or by 
protecting against the comparative disadvantage from not investing in biotechnology 
(Graff and Zilberman 2004). In this view, the European ban of GM products serves as a 
protectionist non-tariff barrier to trade (Lapan and Moschini 2004), and protects the 
European agrochemical firms who are dominant in the traditional crop-protection 
market (Anderson and Jackson 2006; Graff and Zilberman 2007). Additionally, 
Anderson et al. (2004) argue that EU farmers lobby in favor of GM regulation because 
farmers in countries such as the US and Brazil have a comparative advantage applying 
biotechnology. Therefore, it is argued, it is rational for EU farmers to support regulation 
that restricts the use of biotechnology. However, EU farmers were initially less opposed 
to GM technology according to Bernauer (2003), and US and EU GM regulations were 
initially moving in the same direction (Vogel 2001). These observations seem to 
contradict the static trade protection argument. 
There exists an extensive literature on the welfare effects of biotechnology and 
biotechnology regulation. The effect of efficiency-enhancing biotechnology on social 
welfare depends crucially on the extent of consumer aversion to GM products 
(Moschini 2008).
1 Studies also show that the welfare effects of biotechnology regulation 
are complex. Lapan and Moschini (2004) and Veyssiere and Giannakas (2006) show 
that the welfare effects of GM regulation depend on consumer preferences, segregation 
                                                 
1 The early literature ignored this potential consumer aversion and estimated the welfare impact of 
biotechnology innovations measuring traditional consumer and producer surpluses (Alston et al. 1995). 
Even when accounting for market power of innovating biotechnology companies (Moschini and Lapan 
1997), studies found considerable welfare gains from the introduction of new GM products (Falck-
Zepeda et al. 2000) that were shared among consumers, farmers, and agro-chemical innovators 
(Moschini et al. 2000). Recent studies which integrate consumer aversion to GM products find that the 
welfare impact of biotechnology is ambiguous (Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Lapan and Moschini 2004; 
Lence and Hayes 2005; Sobolevsky et al. 2005).   - 5 - 
costs, efficiency gains by the GM technology, and the market power of the innovating 
companies. Fulton and Giannakas (2004) demonstrate that the introduction of GM 
products and the regulation of biotechnology may have different welfare effects on 
different groups in society – such as consumers, farmers, seed companies, and 
innovating life science companies. This inherent rent distribution may induce different 
preferences for biotechnology regulation and conflicting pressures on governments 
which demands a political economy analysis (Josling et al. 2003).  
Therefore, building on our previous work on the political economy of standards 
and regulation (Swinnen and Vandemoortele 2008; 2009a; 2009b), this paper develops 
a general and dynamic political economy model of technology regulation. Our 
framework allows to combine both arguments of differences in consumer preferences 
and producer protectionism to provide a more nuanced explanation for the different 
biotechnology regulations in the EU and the US, and why this difference may persist. 
First, our formal model shows that there exists a critical level of consumer 
preferences below which no technology regulation is imposed. Hence small variations 
in consumer preferences may determine whether a country imposes technology 
regulation or not. If consumer preferences are identical between countries and constant 
over time, countries adopt the same technology regulation and stick to the status quo 
independent of which technology regulation was initially imposed. 
Second, when consumer preferences are different between countries and 
constant over time, different technology regulations may be imposed, and these 
differences may persist because of changing producer interests. If a government chooses 
to allow a technology, it continues to allow that technology independent of what the 
other government decides. If a government however chooses to ban that technology, it 
may continue to do so in the long run depending on the relative impacts of both   - 6 - 
regulatory options on consumers and producers, and their political power. A larger 
political power of producers leads to a larger range of situations where the technology is 
banned in the long run, even though consumers prefer allowing it. In these situations 
producer interests are translated into policy persistence. 
Third, we show that even a temporary difference in consumer preferences 
between countries, a ‘butterfly’, may create a difference in technology regulation that 
may persist after the difference in consumer preferences has disappeared. We show that 
this hysteresis
2 in technology regulation is driven by producer protectionist motives.  
Our work is related to several other papers on hysteresis in socio-economic 
behavior and policy. For example, Dixit (1989a) shows that output price uncertainty 
leads to investment hysteresis for certain ranges of entry and exit costs, and Dixit 
(1989b) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) demonstrate that exchange rate fluctuations 
create similar hysteresis in firms’ export decisions. Hysteresis is also shown to exist in 
labor markets where firing and hiring costs lead to persistence in unemployment (e.g. 
Lindbeck and Snower 1986; Belke and Göcke 1999). Our model is different from these 
contributions, both in the source of variation (small consumer preference variations) that 
triggers technology investment (or not), and in the hysteresis effect (persistence in 
technology regulation due to producer protectionism).
3  
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 advances a general and dynamic 
political economy model of technology regulation. Sections 3, 4, and 5 apply this model 
to three different cases. In the first case (Section 3), consumer preferences are identical 
                                                 
2 Hysteresis is defined as “permanent effects of a temporary stimulus” (Göcke 2002) and originates 
from physics and magnetism (Cross and Allan 1988). See Göcke (2002) for an overview of various 
concepts of hysteresis as applied in economics. 
3 Our paper is also linked to research on path-dependence in technical standards and technical lock-in 
by historical events (Arthur 1989). This type of lock-in is driven by network externalities, increasing 
returns to adoption, or learning by doing. See e.g. David 1985; Farrell and Saloner 1985; Cowan 1990; 
Puffert 2002 for some historical cases.   - 7 - 
between countries and constant over time. In the second case (Section 4), consumer 
preferences are different between countries and constant over time. In the third case 
(Section 5 – the ‘butterfly’ case), consumer preferences are only temporarily different 
between countries. Section 6 discusses the implications of our model, and Section 7 
extends the model in several directions. Section 8 concludes. 
2 The Political Economy of Technology Regulation: A Dynamic Model 
Assume two identical open economies  , kA B = , with between them symmetric 
transportation costs (which could be small, but positive). In both countries we consider 
the same sector in which one product is produced and consumed. Two production 
technologies can be applied to create this product. The technologies differ in their cost-
efficiency, and consumers have some aversion to the ‘cheap’ technology. All consumers 
rank products manufactured with the cheap technology as being of lower quality than 
products produced with the ‘expensive’ technology, but are heterogeneous in their 
willingness to pay for this quality difference. One example is child labor – which is 
cheap – but consumers object to its use. Another example is the installation of 
expensive catalytic converters that, as preferred by consumers, reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions. A last example is conventional farming that uses non-GM seed versus 
biotechnology that applies GM seed. Using biotechnology is cheaper (Falck-Zepeda et 
al. 2000; Lapan and Moschini 2007), but consumers have some aversion to GM 
products (Curtis et al. 2004). 
Technology Regulation and Standards 
In every period  1, 2 t = , each country k ’s government has to decide whether to approve 
the cheap technology or not by setting a standard 
k
t s . We assume that there are only two   - 8 - 
possible levels (high and low) of this standard, i.e.  { } ,
k
tL H s ss ∈  with  HL s s > , where  L s  
refers to a baseline safety and/or quality requirement satisfied by both technologies (see 
also Moschini et al. 2008). If the government sets 
k
tH s s = , the cheap technology is 
prohibited in country k  at time t.  
All domestic producers have to comply with the standard – whether they 
produce for the home or foreign market – and equally all foreign producers who export 
to this country.
4 We assume that only the government can guarantee consumers that a 
good has been produced with the expensive technology.
5 We abstract from government 
enforcement or credibility issues in the implementation of the regulation. 
Producers 
We assume that production is a function of a sector-specific input factor that is available 
in inelastic supply. All profits made in the sector accrue to this specific factor. There are 
at least two firms active in each country, and firms compete on prices. Aggregate 
producer profits at time t in country k  are  





pk k k k k k k
tt t t t t t
p
s xpc s s L − ⎡⎤ Π= ⋅ − + ⎣⎦ , (1) 
where 
k
t p  is the price of the good; 
k
t x  is the quantity produced;  ( ) 1 ,
kk k
tt t css −  is the 
marginal cost; and L is the sector-specific factor owners’ total labor income, realized in 
some other sector(s).
6 Following Amacher et al. (2004) and consistent with Spence 
                                                 
4 These assumptions are consistent with biotechnology regulation. Regulation on domestic producers 
prohibits the production of GM crops, independent of whether they are eventually sold on domestic or 
on foreign markets. 
5 This implies that a producer who produces according to  H s  is not able to market his good as a high 
quality product in a country where the government allows the use of the cheap technology () L s , 
although the producer is allowed to sell his product on that market ( ) HL s s > . 
6 See also Grossman and Helpman (1994). This labor income ensures that producers’ welfare is 
positive and their lobbying contributions credible.   - 9 - 
(1977), Dixit (1980) and Dong and Saha (1998), we use a specific form for the cost 
function: 
  () ( ) ( )
22
11 ,
kk k k k k
tt t t t t css b s a s s −− =+ − , (2) 
where  a and b  are positive parameters. The first term,  ( )
2 k
t bs , represents the ‘cost of 
quality’. As is typical in the vertical differentiation literature, it is a quadratic term: the 
marginal cost function is increasing and convex in the level of the standard (see e.g. 
Ronnen 1991; Valletti 2000). The technology allowed under  H s  is more expensive than 
under  L s :  () ()
22




tt as s − − , represents the ‘investment 
cost’ which is an increasing and convex function of the difference between the standard 
of the current period and the standard of the previous period. If governments switch 
regulation between periods, producers need to adjust to the new regulation and incur a 
one-period increase in their marginal cost. This cost component can be interpreted as a 
capacity investment along the lines of Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980), which depends 
on the current and previous periods’ regulations. All other production costs are 
normalized to zero. 
We assume that  ( ) L HL bs a s s >−  to ensure that producing under the low cost 
technology  L s  is cheaper than under the expensive technology  H s , even when 
producing under  L s  involves an investment cost of switching from  H s  to  L s .
7  
                                                 
7 Given that the expensive technology was in use before, producing with the expensive technology 
costs 
2
H bs , whereas producing with the cheap technology requires investment and costs 
( )
2 2
LH L bs a s s +− . The former costs are larger than the latter if  ( ) ( ) HL HL bs s as s +> −, which 
is true under our assumption.   - 10 - 
Consumers 
We impose a vertical differentiation representation of heterogeneous consumer 
preferences based on Spence (1976), Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Tirole (1988). The 
underlying assumption is that if products with both technologies were available at the 
same price, all consumers would choose the high standard product. Individuals in 
country k  and period t consume at most one unit of the good and their preferences are 
described by the following utility function: 
 
if consumer   buys the good with standard  at price 
=
0 if consumer   does not buy,
kk k k
it t t t
i







where  i φ  is consumer i’s preference parameter.
8 Consumers with higher  i φ  have a 
higher willingness to pay for a product of higher quality, i.e. with a more stringent 
standard 
k
t s . Consumers with 
kk
it t p s φ <  do not consume the product. We assume that 
i φ  is uniformly distributed over the interval  1,
kk
tt φ φ ⎡ ⎤ − ⎣ ⎦  with  1
k
t φ ≥  and  { } 1, ,
k
t iN ∈ … . 
The number of consumers 
k
t N  is constant over time and identical between countries, i.e. 
k
t NN = . The aggregate demand function 
  ( ) ( ) ,
kk k k k k
tt t t t t Dp s N ps φ =− , (4) 
is presumed to be positive at market equilibrium. Consumer surplus in country k  at 












ck k k k















                                                 
8 Our approach of modeling standards is common in the literature on vertical differentiation and GM 
technology (see for example Fulton and Giannakas 2004; Moschini et al. 2008) and consistent with the 
standard approach in the literature on minimum quality standards (see e.g. Ronnen 1991, Jeanneret and 
Verdier 1996, Valletti 2000).   - 11 - 
The Government 
The government maximizes a weighted sum of contributions from interest groups and 
social welfare as in Grossman and Helpman (1994; 1995). Social welfare  ()
kk
tt Ws is 
defined as the sum of producer profits and consumer surplus: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
,, kk p kk c kk
tt t t t t Ws s s ≡Π +Π . (6) 
Interest groups offer contributions to the government conditional on the policy choices 
made by the government. For simplicity, we assume that only producers are politically 
organized, and that an interest group cannot contribute to a foreign government.
9 The 
government’s objective function,  ( )
, gk k
tt s Π , is 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
,, gk k pk k k k
tt tt t t s CsW s α Π≡ + , (7) 
where  ( )
, p kk
tt Cs  is the ‘truthful’
10 contribution scheme of the producers’ interest group; 
and  α  represents its relative lobbying strength. Because the government’s regulatory 
choice is dichotomous, this ‘truthful’ contribution function need only to comprise two 
numbers (see Grossman and Helpman 1995), i.e. the contributions associated with 
allowing the cheap technology,  ( )
, pk
tL Cs , or banning it,  ( )
, pk
tH Cs . We therefore define 
the ‘truthful’ contribution function of the producers’ interest group as 
( ) ( )
,, p kk p kk
tt tt Cs s ≡Π .
11 
                                                 
9 This assumption makes the derivation simpler but is not essential for the results. Consumer interests 
still play a role but through the social welfare function in the government’s objective function. 
10 The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986) argues that a truthful 
contribution schedule must reflect the true preferences of the interest group. In our political economy 
model this requires that interest groups set their lobby contributions in accordance with their expected 
profits linked to the different levels of the public standard.  
11 Our approach is equivalent to assuming that the producers’ interest group represents only a small 
fraction of the population since its contribution scheme does not take into account the effects of 
regulation on consumer surplus (see also Lopez and Matschke 2006).   - 12 - 
Time Framework 
Each period consists of several sequential moves which take place simultaneously in 
both countries. At the beginning of each period, agents take stock of the existing 
technologies. The producers’ interest group then proposes its contribution scheme to the 
government that chooses the standard. We assume that none of the agents takes future 
periods into consideration when making their decisions, i.e. they have a ‘myopic 
planning horizon’ (Göcke 2002). Upon the policy selection, producers make the 
necessary investment if the level of the standard has been altered between periods. 
Finally, the product(s) are produced and sold, and the producers’ interest group makes 
its political contribution.  
A government maintains the existing standard if and only if 
  ( ) ( )
,,
11
gk k k gk k k
ttt ttt s ss s −− Π= ≥ Π≠ , (8) 
or equivalently, if 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,,
11 11
pk k k k k k pk k k k k k
ttt t tt ttt t tt Css W ss Css W ss αα −− −− =+ =≥ ≠+ ≠. (9) 
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that only the expensive technology is 
available before period 1, and that therefore, by default, governments set their standard 
to  00
AB
H s ss ==. This resembles a situation where the expensive technology is a 
conventional existing technology, and the cheap technology is an innovation that 
becomes available in period 1.
12 
  In the next sections, we analyze the governments’ regulatory choices under 
different scenarios: (i) when consumers in both countries have identical preferences, and 
                                                 
12 We focus our analysis on the default option  0
k
H s s =  because this resembles best the issue of 
biotechnology regulation. Oppositely, for issues such as child labor or carbon dioxide emissions, the 
expensive technology is an innovation that becomes available in period 1. In these cases the default 
option is to allow the cheap technology,  0
k
L s s = , and conditions for regulatory hysteresis can be 
obtained in the same analytical framework as presented here.   - 13 - 
these preferences are constant over time; (ii) with different consumer preferences 
between countries and preferences constant over time; and (iii) with a temporary 
difference in consumer preferences (the ‘butterfly’).  
3 Case (i): Constant and Identical Consumer Preferences between Countries 
Consider the case where consumers in both countries have identical preferences, 
A B
tt φ φ =  for  1, 2 t = , that are constant over time,  12
kk φ φ =  for  , kA B = . Under our 
assumptions, both countries are identical and with Bertrand competition and positive 
trade costs, there is no international trade. Thus, it suffices to look at one country.  
Period 1  
The cheap technology becomes available in both countries. Prohibiting its use 
() 1
k




HH cs b s = , while allowing it ( ) 1
k
L s s =  
requires investment to switch between regulations and the marginal cost is 




LL cs b s a =+ Δ , where  HL s s Δ ≡− . Under the assumption of Bertrand 
competition with at least two producers in each country, the market price equals the 
marginal cost of domestic producers,  11




HL s sL Π =Π = . Hence, 
producers are indifferent to the level of the standard in period 1.  
Since price equals marginal cost, consumer surplus 
,
1







bs φ −  for  1
k













 for  1
k
L s s = . Consumers prefer 


















≥= −− ⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦




ck φ  is the consumers’ critical preference value in country k  and period 1.
13 In 
other words, the consumers’ critical preference value is the level of consumer 
preferences below which they prefer allowing the cheap technology. 
  As producers are indifferent, the government follows consumers’ interests and 
the government’s critical preference value 
,
1
g k φ  coincides with the consumers’ one. 














≥= −− ⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. (11) 
 
Result 1: With  L bs a >Δ  and  11





L s s φφ φ ⎡⎡ ∀∈ = ⎣⎣ ; 




















;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
 




gk φ  exists such that if consumer preferences  1
k φ  are strictly lower than 
,
1
gk φ , country k ’s government allows the cheap technology and the politically optimal 
standard is  1
k
L s s = . If  1
k φ  is higher than 
,
1
gk φ , the politically optimal standard is  1
k
H s s =  
and the government prohibits the cheap technology. Result 1 thus shows that a minor 
                                                 
13 Consumer surplus is convex in 
k
t φ  so  ( ) ( )
,, 0
ck ck
tH tL ss Π −Π =  has two solutions in 
k
t φ . Our 
analysis is restricted to the domain  ( )
min k
tH L bs s a φφ ≥= + + Δ , where higher consumer 
preferences for quality lead to larger consumer surplus differences between consuming high and low 
quality.    - 15 - 
difference in consumer preferences can lead to important differences in technology 
regulation. 
  A larger marginal ‘cost of quality’, represented by parameter b , results in a 
larger critical preference value of the government 
,
1








, and thus in a 
larger range of consumer preferences  1
k φ  for which the cheap technology is allowed. 
This is intuitive: for larger b  the additional ‘cost of quality’ of producing with the 
expensive technology is larger, so consumers pay relatively more for the high quality 
product. Thus consumer preferences need to be larger to support the prohibition of the 
cheap technology, which is reflected in a larger 
,
1
gk φ . 
  A higher ‘investment cost’ of switching between regulations, represented by a 
larger value for a, reduces the government’s critical preference value 
,
1






< ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. 
With higher adjustment costs, consumers pay relatively more for the low quality 
product and are thus less in favor of allowing the cheap technology. This is represented 
by a lower critical preference value 
,
1
gk φ  and thus a smaller range of  1
k φ  for which 
1
k
L s s = . 
Period 2 
The analysis of the political equilibrium in period 2 depends on the outcome in period 1, 
i.e. whether  1
k
H s s =  or  1
k
L s s = . Suppose first that 
,
11
kg k φ φ ≥  such that  1
k
H s s = , i.e. the 
cheap technology is prohibited in period 1 (see Result 1). The political equilibrium is 
then the same as in the previous period, since in both periods  1
k
tH s s − =  and consumer 
preferences are constant. The government’s critical preference value in period 2 is the   - 16 - 
same as in period 1, 
,,
21
gk gk φ φ = , and since  21
kk φ φ =  it follows that 
,
22
kg k φ φ ≥ . Hence, if 
the political equilibrium is to prohibit the cheap technology in the first period and 
consumer preferences are constant, the ban on the cheap technology remains in the 
second period, i.e.  2
k
H s s = . 
Second, suppose that 
,
11
kg k φ φ <  such that  1
k
L s s =  and producers invest in the 
cheap technology in period 1. For the same reasons as in the previous period, producers 
are indifferent to the level of the standard. Because production costs and prices are 
different from period 1, the consumers’ critical preference value – and also the 
government’s critical preference value since producers are indifferent – changes with 
respect to period 1. Production under the cheap technology is less costly in period 2 as 




LL L cs b s cs =< . Oppositely, 
production with the expensive technology is more costly because investment is 




HH H cs b s a cs =+ Δ > . The government’s critical preference 














== −+ ⎢ ⎥
− ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
. (12) 
Comparing Equations (11) and (12) shows that 
,,
21
gk gk φ φ > , and given constant consumer 
preferences, we find that 
,
22
kg k φ φ < . Hence, if the cheap technology is allowed in the 
first period and consumer preferences are constant, the political equilibrium is to 
continue allowing the cheap technology in the second period, i.e.  2
k
L s s = .  
   - 17 - 
Result 2: With  L bs a >Δ , 
A B
tt φ φ =  and  12


























;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
 
As summarized in Result 2, our dynamic political economy model shows that, if 
consumer preferences are identical between countries and constant over time, 
governments impose the same regulation in each period. Moreover, Result 2 shows that 
once a government has imposed a certain regulation while both technologies are 
available, it endorses the status quo. Result 2 also implies that minor differences in 
consumer preferences can lead to different technology regulations which persist over 
time. 
4 Case (ii): Constant and Different Consumer Preferences between Countries 
Without loss of generality, we assume that country  A’s consumers have higher 
preferences for quality than country B ’s consumers. Preferences remain constant over 
time:  12 12
A ABB φ φφφ =>=. 
Period 1 
The analysis of the political equilibrium in period 1 is similar to that of case (i). The 
cheap technology becomes available in both countries. Prohibiting that technology 




HH cs b s = , while approving it requires investment 




LL cs b s a = +Δ. Under the assumption of Bertrand   - 18 - 
competition with at least two producers in each country, the market price equals the 
marginal cost of the domestic producers,  11




HL s sL Π =Π =  if 
producers only supply their own domestic market.  
The above outcome is always the case in period 1. Producers only supply their 
own market when standards are the same (see case (i)), but also when standards are 
different between both countries. Consider for example the situation where  1
A
H s s =  and 
1
B








LL cs b s a = +Δ. First, it is prohibited for 
country  B’s producers to export to country  A because they produce under a lower 
standard than what is required in country  A ( ) 11
B A s s < . Second, country  A’s producers 
are allowed to export to country B  as they produce under a sufficiently stringent 
standard  ( ) 11
A B s s > . However, the inability of country  A’s producers to market their 
products as ‘high quality’ on country B’s market prevents them from exporting since 
they incur a higher marginal cost ( ) 11
A B cc > . In summary, producers do not export even 
with different standards because country  A’s producers cannot compete on country 
B’s market based on marginal costs, while country B ’s producers cannot compete on 
country  A’s market based on technology standards. Therefore, producers only supply 




HL s sL Π =Π = , and hence that 
producers are indifferent to the level of the standard in period 1. 
Since the default situation is the same as in case (i) for both countries, the 
consumers’ critical preference value 
,
1
ck φ  is given by Equation (10) for  , kA B = . From 
our assumption that 
A B




B Ac k φ φφ << , the analysis is the same as in case (i) and   ,
k




ck B A φ φφ <<,  ,
k
tH s st k =∀. The third ordering, 
,
11 1
B ck A φ φφ < < , is the   - 19 - 
most interesting one and will be analyzed here.  




A cA φφ >  while country B ’s consumers are in favor of allowing it ( )
,
11
B cB φφ < . As 
producers are indifferent between the two technologies, the government’s critical 
preference value is 
,,
11
g kc k φ φ =  for  , kA B = . Hence, country  A’s government bans the 
cheap technology ( ) 1
A
H s s = , while country B ’s government allows it ( ) 1
B
L s s = . This 
difference in regulation is due to different consumer preferences, and the differences in 
consumer preferences need not be large to result in different regulations. This is 
summarized in Result 3. 
 
Result 3: With  L bs a >Δ  and 
min ,
11 1
B ck A φ φφ φ < <<  for  , kA B = :  
•  1
A
H s s =  and  1
B
















;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
Period 2  
Given the outcome in period 1, the countries begin period 2 with different regulations, 
i.e.  1
A
H s s =  and  1
B
L s s = . This implies that in period 2 the marginal costs under selected 
standards are different between the countries. We first analyze country B ’s political 
equilibrium for each regulation selected by country  A. 
Suppose first that country  A switches between regulations such that  2
A
L s s =  and 




LL cs b s a =+ Δ . Country B ’s producers are then indifferent regarding the 
standard. Under  2
B
H s s = , country B ’s domestic market is protected from imports by a   - 20 - 
more stringent standard ( ) 22





HH pc s b s a ==+ Δ . Under  2
B
L s s = , country B ’s producers competitively 




LL L cs b s cs =<, but these 
additional exports do not result in positive profits for country B ’s producers since they 
compete on prices. The market price in both countries is then  () 22
kB
L p cs = . Hence, 
given  2
A




HL s sL Π= Π= . Country B ’s consumers are however not 
indifferent, since the quality levels and corresponding market prices are different for 
2
B
L s s =  and  2
B
H s s = . If the cheap technology is allowed, consumers benefit from lower 
prices than in period 1 as the investment cost has already been incurred by country B ’s 
producers, whereas if the expensive technology is imposed, investment is needed to 
switch. The consumers’ critical preference value, 
,
2
cB φ , is then given by Equation (12) 
which is higher than in period 1 (Equation (10)), 
,,
21
cB cB φ φ > . In combination with 
constant consumer preferences and 
,
11
B cB φ φ < , it follows that 
,
22
B cB φ φ < . Country B ’s 
consumers thus prefer allowing the cheap technology. Since country B ’s producers are 
indifferent, the government of country B  follows consumers’ preferences and the 
political-economic optimum, given that  2
A
L s s = , is  2
B
L s s = . 
  Second, suppose that country  A maintains its regulation such that  2
A





HH cs b s = . Country B’s producers are then in favor of maintaining the status 
quo, i.e.  2
B
L s s = . Under  2
B
L s s = , country B ’s producers competitively dominate 
country  A’s producers on prices since  ( ) ( ) 22
BA
LH cs cs <  and country  A’s product 
cannot be sold on the market of B  as a high quality good. In contrast, with  2
B
H s s = ,   - 21 - 
exports from  A to B  are allowed ( ) 22
A B s s =  and cheaper  ( ) ( ) ( ) 22
AB
HH cs cs < ,
14 since 
country  B ’s producers need to invest in switching technologies while country  A’s 
producers do not. Hence country B ’s producers are driven out of their own market with 
2
B
H s s = , and therefore favor  2
B
L s s = . Country B ’s consumers are indifferent neither. 
With  2
B
L s s = , country B ’s domestic market price is  ( ) 22
BB
L p cs = , while for  2
B
H s s = , 
the domestic market price is  ( ) 22
BA
H p cs =  since imports from  A are allowed and 















φ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ −
. (13) 
 Comparing Equations (13) and (10), one observes that 
,,
21
cB cB φ φ >  and hence 
,
22
B cB φ φ <  
so that country B ’s consumers prefer to allow the cheap technology. As a result, since 
both country B ’s producers and consumers favor allowing the cheap technology, it is in 
the interest of country B ’s government to endorse this status quo, i.e.  2
B
L s s = , given 
that  2
A
H s s = . 
  To summarize, the political-economic optimum for country B ’s government is 
to continue its policy of allowing the cheap technology, i.e.  2
B
L s s = , irrespective of 
country  A’s regulation in period 2. Hence, once country B ’s government has chosen to 
allow the cheap technology, it will endorse the status quo in future periods and support 
the cheap technology, irrespective of the behavior of the other country’s government. 
This policy persistence is summarized in the following result: 
                                                 
14 This requires that transportation costs are smaller than the difference between  ( ) 2
A
H cs and 
() 2
B
H cs. We assume that transportation costs are sufficiently small, such that we do not need to 
introduce them algebraically.   - 22 - 
 
Result 4: With  L bs a >Δ ,  12
kk φ φ =  and 
min ,
11 1
B ck A φ φφ φ < <<  for  , kA B = :  
•  2
B
L s s = , independent of  2
















;  ( )
min
HL bs s a φ = ++ Δ . 
 
Given this result, we only need to consider  2
B
L s s =  when evaluating country 
A’s strategic response. If  2
A
L s s = , the marginal cost of country  A’s producers is 




LL cs b s a =+ Δ  since they need to invest in switching. In contrast, country B ’s 




LL cs b s = . In that case, 




L L s La N b s φ ⎡ ⎤ Π= − Δ − ⎣ ⎦  if they wish to 
remain active in their own market since  222
A BA p cc = <  due to cheaper imports from 
country  B . If  2
A
H s s = , country  A’s producers are protected from imports by a more 
stringent standard since  22
A B s s > , such that under price competition 








H s L Π= . Accordingly, country  A’s producers always 
endorse the status quo in period 2, since 




HL L s s aN bs φ ⎡⎤ Π− Π= Δ − > ⎣⎦ . (14) 
Country  A’s consumers may or may not favor the status quo in period 2. If  2
A
L s s = , 







s bs φ Π= − . If  2
A







s bs φ Π= − . Hence:   - 23 - 
  () () () ()
22 ,,
22 2 2 22
cA cA A A HL
HL H L
Ns Ns
s sb s b s φφ Π− Π= − − − , (15) 















φ ⎡ ⎤ =− ⎣ ⎦ −
. (16) 
Comparing values (16) and (10) reveals that 
,,
21
cA cA φ φ > . There are two situations 
according to the level of country  A’s consumer preferences,  2
A φ . First, if 
,,
122
cA cA A φ φφ << , country  A’s consumers favor the status quo in period 2, i.e.  2
A
H s s = . 
As a result, it is optimal for country  A’s government to set  2
A
H s s =  since country  A’s 
producers also endorse the status quo.  
In the second situation, 
,,
12 2
cA A cA φ φφ << , country  A’s consumers are in favor of 
allowing the cheap technology in period 2 in contrast to the first period. The reason for 
this change in consumers’ interests is that in period 2 the low quality good can be 
imported from country B  at a lower price than in period 1 when it was still more 
expensive due to the investment cost. In this situation, a coalition switch takes place 
between period 1 and 2, since both producer interests (from being indifferent to favoring 
H s ) and consumer interests (from favoring  H s  to favoring  L s ) change. 
Which regulation is then optimal for country  A’s government depends on the 
relative differences in producer profits and consumer surpluses between the two 
regulatory options, and the relative weight of producers’ contributions in the 
government’s objective function ( ) α . Inserting Equations (14) and (15) into Equations 
(6) and (7) gives 







aN bs bs bs αφ φ φ ⎡⎤ Ψ= + Δ − + − − − ⎣⎦ , (17)   - 24 - 




HL s s Ψ=Π −Π . By definition of 
,
2
gA φ ,  0 Ψ =  at 
,
22
A gA φ φ = . Observe that 
the second and third term of Equation (17) together are identical to Equation (15) which 
equals zero at 
,
2
cA φ . From Equation (14) it follows that  0 Ψ >  at 
,
22
A cA φ φ = . The 
derivative of Equation (17) with respect to  2
A φ  is positive for 
min
2












gA cA φ φ < . (19) 
This inequality implies that for a certain range of consumer preferences, 
,,
22 2 ,
A gA cA φφ φ ⎡⎡ ∈⎣⎣ , lobbying by the producers’ interest group is sufficiently powerful to 
induce country  A’s government to uphold the status quo even though consumers prefer 
to allow the cheap technology. For 
,,
21 2 ,
A cA gA φφ φ ⎡ ⎡ ∈⎣ ⎣, the producers’ interest group fails 
in pushing its agenda and the optimal decision for country  A’s government is to allow 
the cheap technology. 
The value of 
,
2
gA φ  depends on the political power of the producers’ interest 























Equation (21) implies that the government’s critical preference value, 
,
2
gA φ , decreases if 
the political power of the producers’ interest group, α , increases. Intuitively, if the 
producers’ interest group has more influence on the government, the range 
,,
22 ,
gA cA φφ ⎡⎡ ⎣⎣    - 25 - 
for which the government chooses to endorse the status quo expands. In the special case 
where  α  is sufficiently high such that 
,,
21
gA cA φ φ ≤ , country  A’s government always 
prohibits the cheap technology since 
,
11 2
cA A A φ φφ < = . We summarize the results for the 
optimal behavior of country  A’s government in Result 5. 
 
Result 5: With  L bs a >Δ ,  12
kk φ φ =  and 
min ,
11 1




A gA φ φ = , then: 
•  1
A
H s s = ;  12
BB




cA cA φ φ < ; 
,,
22
gA cA φ φ < ; 
•  for 
,
22
A gA φ φ ≥ :  2
A
H s s = ; 
•  for 
,
22
A gA φ φ < :  2
A






































HL bs s a φ =+ + Δ . 
 
Our dynamic political economy model shows that differences in consumer preferences 
between countries may lead to differences in technology regulation. These differences 
may persist over time, however not because of the differences in consumer preferences 
but for reasons of producer protectionism. This is driven by the investment cost that 
induces producers in both countries to switch from being indifferent in the first period 
to supporting the status quo in the second period. If a government chooses to allow the 
cheap technology, it prefers a regulatory status quo no matter what the other 
government decides. If a government chooses to ban the cheap technology, it will prefer   - 26 - 
the regulatory status quo depending on the relative impacts on consumers and producers 
of both regulatory options, and the political power of the producers’ interest group. A 
larger political power of the producers’ interest group leads to a larger range of 
circumstances where the status quo is maintained, even though consumers oppose it. 
Different technology regulations are initiated by differences in consumer preferences, 
but persistence in these regulatory differences is motivated by producers’ interests. 
5 Case (iii): A Temporary Difference in Consumer Preferences 
In this section, we show that even if the difference in consumer preferences is only 
temporary and potentially small (a ‘butterfly’), hysteresis in technology regulation and 
long-lasting regulatory differences may emerge between countries. To this end, we 
assume that consumer preferences are different between countries in period 1 but 
identical in period 2. There are two potential scenarios. In the first scenario, country 
A’s consumer preferences are higher in period 1,  11
A B φ φ > , but in period 2 they fall to 
the level of those in country B ,  22
A B φ φ = , which have remained constant () 12
B B φ φ = . In 
the second scenario, country  A’s consumer preferences are also higher in period 1, 
11
A B φ φ > , but in period 2 country B ’s consumer preferences rise to the level of those in 
country  A,  22
A B φ φ = , which have remained constant ( ) 12
A A φ φ = .  
Scenario 1:  1122
A BBA φ φφφ >== 
Assume, consistent with  11
A B φ φ > , that 
,
11
A ck φ φ >    and 
,
11
Bc k φ φ <   , with 
,
1
ck φ  as in Equation 
(10). The difference between  1
A φ  and  1
B φ  is only minor since both approach 
,
1
ck φ    - 27 - 
respectively from above and below.
15 In line with Result 3, the governments’ optimal 
choices in period 1 are respectively  1
A
H s s =  and  1
B
L s s = . Country  A’s government 
prohibits the cheap technology, while country B ’s government allows it. 




A BBc k φφφφ ==<   . Following Result 4, the political-economic equilibrium in 
country  B  is to unconditionally uphold the status quo whereas according to Result 5, 
country  A’s political-economic equilibrium depends on the political power of the 
producers’ interest group. If α  is sufficiently high such that 
,
22
gA A φ φ ≤ , the producers’ 
interest group lobbies successfully to endorse the status quo although consumers prefer 
to allow the cheap technology ( )
,,
21 2
A ck ck φφ φ <<   . If however the producers’ interest 
group is politically weak (α  low) such that 
,
22
A gA φ φ < , the government allows the cheap 
technology. Table 1 summarizes the first scenario. 
This scenario shows that if the producers’ interest group in country  A has 
sufficient political power, both countries remain having different technology 
regulations, even though consumer preferences are identical. The ‘butterfly’, the 
temporary difference in consumer preferences, triggers different initial regulatory 
choices and investment which lead to a coalition switch in country  A as consumer and 
producer interests change. Country  A’s producers lobby successfully to uphold the 
status quo in period 2 which protects them from cheaper imports, while consumers 
prefer the cheap technology. Hence the temporary difference in consumer preferences 
leads to initial differences in regulation, but it are the producer protectionist motives that 
                                                 
15 In terms of chaos theory, the situation in period 1 is a hypersensitive one (Smith 1991), meaning that 
other states arbitrarily close to the hypersensitive one could eventually lead to highly divergent 
dynamical behavior.   - 28 - 
cause hysteresis and long-lasting differences in technology regulation.
16 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the interests of country  A’s producers in upholding the 
status quo where for simplicity world demand is assumed constant and equal to 1. The 
default situation is that initially only the expensive technology is available, i.e.  0
k




H ppb s ==, and the equilibrium is at  0 E . In period 1, because of the temporary 
difference in consumer preferences, country B  allows the cheap technology while 
country  A prohibits it ( 1
B
L s s =  and  1
A
H s s = ). The marginal cost and price are lower in 





LH p bs a bs p =+ Δ < = . Due to the different regulations and marginal costs, the 
markets are separated and the equilibrium is different for each country ( 1
A E  and  1
B E ). In 
period 2, country B  sticks unconditionally to the status quo such that its marginal cost 




L pb sp =< , and its equilibrium is at  2
B E . If country  A 
would also allow the cheap technology, country  A’s producers would produce at 
marginal cost 
22
L bs a +Δ. These are higher than in country B  because they do not need 
to switch and have gained a first-mover advantage in the cheap technology. In that case, 
country  A’s equilibrium would be at  2
A E    and country  A’s producers would suffer a 
decrease in profits equal to 
2 2 aΔ  in the figure. If however country  A upholds its 
status quo, country  A’s equilibrium is at  2
A E , the markets remain separated, and 
country  A’s producers do not suffer a decrease in profits. Hence successful lobbying by 
country  A’s producers leads to hysteresis in technology regulation and long-lasting 
regulatory differences.  
                                                 
16 In the classification of Göcke (2002), this hysteresis effect is a form of ‘non-ideal relay hysteresis’, 
which is part of the group ‘microeconomic hysteresis’. This group shares the common feature that a 
certain critical value must be passed to induce persistent hysteresis effects.    - 29 - 
Scenario 2:  1122
B AAB φ φφφ <== 
Define government B ’s critical preference value as 
,
2





gB ck φ φ >  and 
,
2 0
gB dd φα > . These properties imply that if the 
producers’ political power is sufficiently strong in country B , the status quo in 
technology regulation is maintained ( ) 2
B




B ck gB φφ φ ⎡⎡ ∈⎣⎣ .
18 
Table 2 summarizes the second scenario. Assume that in period 1, 
,
12
A ck φ φ >  and 
,
11
B ck φ φ < , which is consistent with  11
A B φ φ >  since 
,,
12
ck ck φ φ <  (defined by respectively 
Equations (10) and (16)). According to Result 3,  1
A
H s s =  and  1
B
L s s = . In period 2 
consumer preferences increase in country B  so that  221
BAA φ φφ = = . Since 
,
22
A ck φ φ > , 
country  A’s government continues banning the cheap technology,  1
A
H s s =  (see Result 
5). Whether country B’s government chooses the status quo or not depends on the 
political power of the producers’ interest group in country B . If the producers’ interest 
group has sufficient political power (α  high) such that 
,
22
gB B φ φ > , the status quo will be 
endorsed although consumers prefer the expensive technology ( )
,
22




gB B φ φ ≤ , the producers’ interest group in country B  is unsuccessful at 
pushing for the status quo, and the cheap technology is prohibited. 
This scenario demonstrates that if the producers’ interest group has sufficient 
political power in country B , its government continues allowing the cheap technology 
although consumers want to ban it, and the regulatory difference between the countries 
                                                 
17 The derivations of these properties are similar to those of 
,
2
gA φ  (Equations (18) to (21)). 




k φ φ <  and found that 
,,
12
ck ck φ φ < , the range 
, ,
2 22 ,
gB Bc k φφ φ ⎡⎡ ∈⎣⎣  was never relevant which explains why we did not introduce 
,
2
gB φ  before.   - 30 - 
persists although consumer preferences are identical. The temporary difference in 
consumer preferences triggers different regulatory choices and investment in period 1. 
Because country  A’s producers gain a first-mover advantage by not switching 
technologies in the first period, they produce in period 2 at a lower marginal cost with 
the expensive technology. By lobbying to uphold the status quo in technology 
regulation, country B’s producers protect themselves from this competitive 
disadvantage. Hence also in the second scenario, the temporary difference in consumer 
preferences leads to different initial regulations, but it is again a producer protectionist 
motive that causes hysteresis in technology regulation and long-lasting differences in 
regulation between countries. 
In conclusion, our dynamic political economy model shows that in the second 
period producers in both countries favor technology regulation that excludes foreign 
imports, due to technology-specific investments (or the absence of these investments) 
that were triggered by a temporary difference in consumer preferences in the first 
period. The model shows that policy persistence in (differences in) technology 
regulation may occur because governments cater domestic producers’ interests, creating 
hysteresis in technology regulation. 
6 Discussion and Implications 
Our model indicates that both consumer preferences and protectionist motives play an 
important role in (differences in) technology regulation. We now apply the insights 
from our model to explain the difference in biotechnology regulation between the US 
and EU.  
The food scares that plagued Europe in the second half of the 1990s, such as the 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, commonly known as the ‘mad cow’ disease),   - 31 - 
the food and mouth disease (FMD) and dioxin crises triggered (temporarily) higher 
consumer preferences for quality and safety in Europe (Bernauer 2003; Vogel 2003; 
Graff and Zilberman 2007; Scholderer 2005). In line with case (ii) for permanently 
higher European consumer preferences, or with the first scenario of case (iii) for 
temporarily higher European consumer preferences, these differences induced different 
initial GM regulations and investments in the US and Europe. The US allowed GM 
technology (country B ) and the EU de facto prohibited it (country  A). Because of 
these different initial regulations producers’ interests changed: US producers became 
supporters of GM technology, while European producers became opponents. By 
lobbying the government to protect their home markets, producers obtained the status 
quo and created hysteresis in biotechnology regulation. Hence the producers’ interests 
are the reason that the differences in GM regulation persist, if the difference in 
preferences is permanent (case (ii)) or temporary (scenario 1 of case (iii)). This 
argument is supported by Graff and Zilberman (2004) who argue that GM regulation in 
name of consumer interests may equally support agrochemical companies and farmers 
by protecting against the comparative disadvantage from either investing or not 
investing in GM technology. It are thus differences in consumer preferences that created 
initial differences in GM regulation, but producer interests that lead to hysteresis in GM 
regulation. This is also consistent with the fact that, before the food safety crises, 
European producers were less opposed to GM technology (Bernauer 2003) and that 
initially EU and US GM regulations were on the same track (Vogel 2001). 
The main cause of this regulatory hysteresis is that producers incur a cost of 
switching between different technologies. This is in line with Coate and Morris (1999) 
who argue that “It is clear that the phenomena of [policy] persistence is driven by the 
existence of switching costs which drive a wedge between the firm’s willingness to pay   - 32 - 
for the policy […].”. The important implication is that to change biotechnology 
regulation in Europe, one needs to ensure that European producers have the possibility 
to adjust their production technology without losing profits to foreign imports. This fits 
well some of the recent German regulations on biotechnology. Germany allows 
cultivation of the ‘Amflora’ potato, a GM crop developed by the German chemicals 
group BASF while at the same time Germany bans cultivation and sale of GM maize 
(MON 810) produced by the US company Monsanto, despite the fact that both crops 
have been approved for cultivation at EU level. This suggests that Germany is providing 
time for its producers to switch between conventional and GM technology without 
loosing market share to foreign imports.  
If it are instead the US consumer preferences that are temporarily lower, the 
second scenario of case (iii) explains the different GM regulation in the US and EU. In 
this view, temporarily lower US consumer preferences triggered differences in initial 
GM regulation. However US producers’ interests are then the reason that differences in 
biotechnology regulation persist even if there is no longer a difference in consumer 
preferences. If the US producers’ interest group has sufficient political power, they 
succeed in obtaining the regulatory status quo, which allows using GM technology. For 
example, Charles (2001) provides a fascinating account of the views and strategies of 
influential persons within Monsanto and other biotechnology-related companies and 
how their views changed the companies lobbying activities during certain periods. 
Charles (2001) also argues that the Reagan administration was very much opposed to 
additional regulations, and according to Stewart et al. (2002) the Bush administration 
explicitly decided to push for GM technology. These factors put higher political weight 
on producers’ interests in the US which, according to our model, leads to a continuation 
of the approval of GM technology in the US, even if US consumers would oppose it,   - 33 - 
and causes regulatory hysteresis.  
7 Extensions of the Model 
It is possible to extend our model in several directions – we merely indicate some of 
them, where possible in application to GM technology. First, we have assumed that 
consumer preferences in the second period are independent from regulation in the first 
period, i.e. that  ( ) 21 1
kk k f s φφ =+  with  ( ) 1 0
k fs = . However, it is not unlikely that 
consumer preferences are affected by previous regulation, for example because the 
experience of (not) consuming GM products alters consumer preferences. In countries 
where GM products are available consumer preferences may shift in favor of this 
technology, while inversely consumers may distrust GM technology more in countries 
where GM products have been banned.
19 Extending the model by assuming that 
()0 H fs >  and  ( ) 0 L fs <  would reinforce our results. Consider case (ii) where 
consumer preferences are in period 1 higher in country  A, and where consequently the 
cheap technology is banned in country  A but not in country B  ( ) 11 ; 
AB
H L s ss s == . The 
assumption that  () 21 1
kk k f s φφ =+  with  ( ) 0 H fs >  and  ( ) 0 L fs <  implies that in period 
2 consumer preferences in country  A increase, whereas in country B  consumer 
preferences decrease. It is straightforward from the previous analysis that Result 4 
would not alter. Moreover, since then  21
A A φ φ > , the range of situations where 
,
22
A gA φ φ >  
and  2
A
H s s =  would increase, thus extending the range where policy persistence in 
country  A’s technology ban occurs (see Result 5). 
Another extension relates to the source of country differences. Hysteresis in 
                                                 
19 Media could play an important role in this – see e.g. McCluskey and Swinnen (2004); Kuzyk et al. 
(2005).   - 34 - 
differences in technology regulation may be caused by other factors than temporary 
differences in consumer preferences. For example, producers located in an environment 
favorable to technological innovation may have an advantage over other producers in 
investing in a new technology. A temporary investment advantage can be modeled by 
assuming that country B ’s producers incur a lower investment cost than country  A’s 
producers in period 1 () 11
B A aa < . This temporarily lower investment cost may also lead 
to (persistence in) different technology regulations. Assume that consumer preferences 
for quality 
k
t φ  are constant and identical between countries. The lower value of  1
B a  leads 
to a higher value of 
,
1
ck φ  in both countries (see Equation (10)) since also country  A’s 





t φ φ < , country B ’s government would allow the cheap technology since 
country  B ’s producers are indifferent. Country  A’s producers however oppose the 
cheap technology since they would be competitively dominated if the cheap technology 
were allowed, as  11
A B aa > . Therefore country  A’s producers lobby in favor of 
prohibiting the cheap technology, and 
,,
11
gA ck φ φ < . If the political power of country  A’s 
producers is sufficiently high such that 
,
11
gA k φ φ < , country  A’s government prohibits 
the cheap technology in the first period. The analysis of period 2, when  22
A B aa = , is then 
similar to case (ii). Hence a temporary difference in investment costs may also lead to 
an initial difference in technology regulation which results in hysteresis in (differences 
in) technology regulation due to producer lobbying. According to Charles (2001), this 
was an important driver at Calgene, a biotechnology company located in Silicon Valley, 
US, that has been acquired by Monsanto in the meantime. 
  Another extension would be to specify the different subgroups that are 
aggregated in the group of ‘producers’. In reality there exists considerable   - 35 - 
heterogeneity, both horizontally and vertically. For example, horizontally, there are 
different types of ‘producers’ who vary in productivity and ability to apply different 
technologies. Vertically, the supply chain consists of different agents such as for 
example in the case of GM technology, farmers, seed companies, biotechnology 
companies, and producers of other inputs such as agro-chemical companies. These 
agents may have conflicting interests with respect to GM regulation (Fulton and 
Giannakas 2004). For example, biotechnology companies oppose GM technology 
regulation to fully exploit their innovations. In contrast, agro-chemical companies who 
produce traditional crop-protection products that are incompatible with or substitutes of 
GM technology favor biotechnology regulation in order to protect their market share in 
the crop protection market. On the other hand, if such an agro-chemical company sells 
chemicals that are complementary to biotechnology, they also oppose GM technology 
restrictions (Just and Hueth 1993). Seed companies may prefer to restrict GM 
technology or not, depending on how much market power the biotechnology firms have 
and how much the seed companies’ margins are squeezed by the biotechnology 
companies. Additionally, GM regulation may entail further costs on seed companies 
such as segregation costs (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2007). Similarly, farmers may oppose 
or favor GM regulation, depending on the impact on input and output prices and 
whether they incur extra costs (Veyssiere and Giannakas 2006). Depending on how 
these different agents in the supply chain interact, the distribution of market power in 
the supply chain, and the political power of the different agents, different outcomes may 
result. Separating out these different interest groups substantially complicates the 
analysis and is left for future research. 
Finally, we have assumed that technology regulation is a one-dimensional and 
dichotomous standard, while in reality governments have a broad range of policy   - 36 - 
instruments at their disposal. For example, we have not allowed for labeling policies 
that would give consumers the opportunity to choose (see e.g. Golan et al. 2001; Fulton 
and Giannakas 2004; Moschini 2008). In the case of GM technology, governments may 
also impose maximum contamination levels. Biotechnology regulation may also 
distinguish between GM technology that is used for animal feed, or food for human 
consumption. Of course, all these different regulations may have different effects on 
different actors in the market, and interest groups who oppose GM regulation may still 
prefer one type of regulation over another. 
8 Conclusions 
Our paper advances a dynamic political-economic model of regulation, in which two 
countries’ governments need to decide which of two technologies to allow in each of 
two periods. One technology allows to produce at lower marginal cost, but consumers 
have some (heterogeneous) aversion to it. Switching between technologies involves a 
one-time marginal cost increase. First we have shown the existence of a critical 
(consumer) preference value above which the cheap technology is prohibited. A small 
variation in consumer preferences may thus determine whether a country bans a 
technology or not. 
Second, the dynamic model showed that if consumer preferences are constant 
and identical between countries, countries adopt the same technology regulation and 
stick to the status quo independent of the initial technology regulation. 
Third, constant but different consumer preferences between countries may 
lead to different technology regulations in the first period, depending on how the 
countries’ consumer preferences are positioned with respect to the critical value. If 
different technologies are adopted in the first period, the government that initally   - 37 - 
allows the cheap technology always endorses the status quo in the long run, 
independent of the other country’s regulation. The government that initially prohibits 
the cheap technology may also support the status quo because producers’ interests 
switch around, even though consumers may wish to change. Producers are initially 
indifferent but because of the switching cost they suffer a competitive disadvantage in 
applying the cheap technology. Therefore they lobby to maintain the ban on the cheap 
technology to protect themselves from cheaper imports from the country that adopts 
the cheap technology, and succeed if their political power is sufficiently strong. 
Hence producer lobbying, not consumer preferences, leads to policy persistence and 
long-run differences in technology regulation. 
Fourth, the previous results may also hold when the difference in consumer 
preferences is only temporary. A temporary difference in consumer preferences may 
trigger different initial regulations, and thus different investments. In the next period, 
producers in both countries favor technology regulation that excludes foreign imports, 
due to technology-specific investments (or the absence of these). Hence, despite 
identical consumer preferences in the long run, regulatory differences may be long-
lasting because governments respond to pressures of domestic producers, creating 
hysteresis in technology regulation. We have demonstrated that similar results may be 
obtained from temporary differences in company strategies that result in different 
investment costs.  
This model illustrates that both consumer preferences and protectionist 
motives play an important role in explaining the differences in GM technology 
regulation between the EU and US. Higher consumer preferences for regulation in 
Europe due to food safety crises triggered differences in initial GM regulation. 
However the domestic producer interests, in Europe and the US, are the reason that   - 38 - 
differences in biotechnology regulation persist even if there is no longer a difference 
in consumer preferences. By contributing to the government to protect their home 
markets, European as well as US producers create hysteresis in biotechnology 
regulation and long-lasting regulatory differences. 
The main cause of this regulatory persistence is the cost of switching between 
different technologies. In order to induce a change in technology regulation one needs to 
ensure that producers can adjust their production technology without losing profits to 
foreign imports. This reduces producers’ incentives to lobby in favor of a status quo in 
technology regulation, and would remove differences in regulation between countries, 
all else equal.   - 39 - 
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 Table 2:  A Temporary Difference in Consumer Preferences: Scenario 2 with 
1122
BAAB φ φφφ <== 
t  A  B  
k
t s  
1  ( )
,,
12 1
A ck ck φ φφ >>  
,
11
B ck φ φ <  
1
A
H s s =  
1
B




A ck φ φ >  
,
22
B ck φ φ >  
2
A







if     high










⎧ > ⎪ = ⎨ ≤ ⎪ ⎩
 
 
   - 44 - 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Interests at Stake of Country  A’s Producers to Maintain the Status Quo in 
Technology Regulation 
  1/2 
0
B p  
1
B p  
01 2
A AA p pp == 
2
B p  
01 2
A A EEE == 
1
B E  
22
B A EE =    
2
H bs  
2
L bs  
22
L bs a +Δ 
A p  
B p  